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Abstract 
This study examines the role of the Russian media in affecting public opinion in Russia regarding the Russian intervention in 2008. 
The largest armed conflict in Europe since  Kosovo in 1999, the August 2008 war was fought between Georgia and Russia over the 
proclaimed independence of the Georgian separate governments of Abkhazia and South Ossetia which were supported by Russia. Rus-
sia intervened militarily and recognized the independence of the two separatist regions, supported by an overwhelming majority of the 
Russian population.  This study analyzes the role of the Russian media in affecting the Russian public opinion regarding its government’s 
policies in relation to Georgia. The method used for study is discourse analysis, and the theoretical framework underlying the research 
is Barry Buzan’s (et al., 1998) concept of securitization and Edward Herman’s and Noam Chomsky’s (1988) concept of manufacturing 
consent which was later elaborated by Anthony DiMaggio (2009).  The trends identified in the mainstream Russian media coverage may 
at least partly account for the positive opinion of the Russian public towards the intervention.  The study also revealed the contrasting 
trends characterizing the mainstream and alternative Russian media coverage, thus once again confirming the crucial role of the media in 
establishing the different opinions among the public, by “building” contrasting images of the world.
Keywords: Abkhazia, armed conflict, Buzan, Chomsky, coverage, DiMaggio, discourse analysis,  Herman,  independence, manu-
facturing consent, recognition, securitization, separatist regions, South Ossetia War
After collapse of Soviet Union separatist conflicts 
erupted in two territories of Georgia - Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, accompanied by the civil war in the capital. “On 
August 14, 1992, a fratricidal war broke out on the resort 
beaches of Abkhazia, a small territory located on the Black 
Sea coast of the newly independent Republic of Georgia. A 
16-month conflict ensued between Abkhaz forces and the 
central government of Georgia. The Abkhaz fought for ex-
panded autonomy and ultimately full independence from 
Georgia; the Georgian government sought to maintain 
control over its territory. Intensive battles raged on land, 
air and sea. Several thousand were killed and many more 
wounded on both sides.” (HRW, 1995, 5) At the end of 
the conflict, “The Abkhaz attacks triggered a mass flight 
of Georgian civilians that international relief organizations 
roughly estimated at 230,000 to 250,000 people.” (HRW, 
1995:43) They still live as Internally Displaced Persons 
within Georgia or as refugees in other countries. Accord-
ing to the Human Rights Watch, Georgians constituted 
50% of the population in Abkhazia, as opposed to 17 % 
Abkhazian, so the expulsion of Georgians caused a drastic 
change in the demographic situation there (HRW,1995:11). 
“The conflict in Abkhazia was heightened by the involve-
ment of Russia, mostly on the Abkhaz side, especially dur-
ing the war’s initial stages. Whereas Russia has endorsed 
the territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia, Russian 
arms found their way into Abkhaz hands, Russian planes 
bombed civilian targets in Georgian-controlled territory, 
Russian military vessels, manned by supporters of the 
Abkhaz side, were made available to shell Georgian-held 
Sukhumi, and at least a handful of Russian-trained and 
Russian-paid fighters defended Abkhaz territory in Tk-
varcheli.“ (HRW, 1995:7)
In South Ossetia it was a completely integrated and 
mixed Ossetian-Georgian population. There has been inter-
marriage and a sense of common understanding going back 
to distant history (Totten, 2008).  Historical name of South 
Ossetia is Samachablo, which means “the land of Macha-
beli” – an old Georgian noble surname. The usage of the 
term South Ossetia dates back to the 19-th century and is 
a part of the colonial policy, usually referred to as “divide 
and rule”. This strategy was reinforced by officially intro-
ducing the term “South Ossetia” by the government of the 
Soviet Union in 1922, to prepare the ground for the dis-
pute (Kvirikashvili, 2010). In 1992-93 Military confronta-
tion in South Ossetia between South Ossetian separatists 
and Georgian government forces resulted in thousands of 
displaced people, the majority of which were ethnic Geor-
gians. The conflict in South Ossetia was characterized by 
“sporadic Russian involvement overwhelmingly in support 
of the separatists.” (HRW, 2009:16-17)
Both separatist wars ended with the deployment of 
Russian peacekeeping forces on the separatist territories. 
In 2006, Georgian parliament called for replacing the Rus-
sian peacekeepers with international police contingent, 
contending that Russia’s “peacekeeping” troops formed 
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one of the main obstacles to peaceful resolution of the con-
flicts (Socor, 2006). 
The Rose Revolution (2003) was a popular blood-
less revolution that brought Georgia’s current president 
Mikheil Saakashvili to power and replaced Eduard She-
vardnadze. Saakshvili’s pro-Western orientation, most no-
tably his aspiration to join NATO, caused escalation of ten-
sions in the relations of Georgia and Russia (Totten, 2008). 
Russian embargo on Georgian products and the massive 
expulsion of Georgians from Russia in 2006 followed (Ji-
bladze, 2006). 
In April 2008, in Bucharest, Romania, Georgia was 
promised eventual membership of NATO but was refused 
Membership Action Plan (MAP). After Bucharest, the re-
lationship between Russia and Georgia significantly aggra-
vated. Russia started adding weaponry to its peacekeep-
ing bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and increased the 
distribution of Russian passports to the people living in the 
separatist regions (Totten, 2008). On April 16 2008 Putin 
signed a presidential decree recognizing the documents of 
Abkhazians and South Ossetians in Russia and vice versa, 
thus integrating these two territories into Russia’s legal 
space. In July Russia launched the biggest military exer-
cise in the North Caucasus since the Chechnya war (Totten, 
2008). There have been allegations that Russia started to 
prepare for the invasion when Georgia was denied NATO 
Membership Action Plan (Whitmore, 2008). 
In August 2008, after months of escalating tensions 
between Russia and Georgia and military clashes between 
South Ossetian and Georgian government forces, Russia 
intervened militarily in Georgia with the declared purpose 
of protecting Russian peacekeepers deployed in South Os-
setia and those residents who had become Russian citizens 
in recent years. On August 10, Russian forces occupied 
undisputed Georgian territory in Southern and Western 
Georgia. On August 15 a ceasefire agreement was signed 
between Russia and Georgia brokered by the French Euro-
pean Union presidency. On August 26, Russia recognized 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states (Whit-
more, 2008).  The 2008 August war was the largest out-
break of fighting in Europe since the Kosovo war in 1999. 
Hundreds died in the shelling and fighting and close to two 
hundred thousand people were displaced from their homes 
(Toal, 2008:1). 
The majority of Russian population supported the Rus-
sian government’s intervention in Georgia in 2008. Rus-
sian Analytical Digest presented opinion polls conducted 
from August 10 to 18 in 2008, most of which were con-
ducted by the Levada center. According to these polls, 70% 
of Russians thought that Russian leaders did everything to 
prevent the conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia, 
while only 4% thought they had provoked the conflict in 
order to promote Russia’s political interests (See Graph 1).
Graph 1: How Would You Assess the Actions of the Russian Leaders in 
the Conflict Between Georgia and South Ossetia.
Source: Survey conducted by the Russian public opinion research 
institute Levada-center, August 15-18, 2008.(Petrova, Russian Analytical 
Digest, 2008:19).
In the opinion of 66% of Russians, the leaders of West-
ern countries supported Georgia in order to weaken Russia 
and push it out of Caucasus. 78% approved of the decision 
of the Russian leadership to send troops to South Ossetia to 
conduct a military operation. 
54 % of Russians in August 2008 thought that South 
Ossetia was an independent state, as opposed to 41 % in 
2006; 23% in 2008 thought South Ossetia was an integral 
part of Georgia, as opposed to 27 % in 2006. The rest gave 
no answer (see Graph 2).
Graph 2: In Your Opinion, Is South Ossetia Today an Integral Part of 
Georgia or an Independent State? (2006 vs. 2008)
Source: Survey conducted by the public opinion Foundation, August 16-
17, 2008.(Petrova, Russian Analytical Digest, 2008:21).
The number of those who thought Abkhazia was an 
independent state rose from 24 % in 2006 to 44 % % in 
August 2008. The number of those who thought Abkhazia 
was an integral part of another state fell from 36 % in 2006 
to 27 % in 2008. The rest gave no answer. Also, in August 
2008, 66% of Russians thought if South Ossetia applied to 
join the Russian Federation, Russia should accept them. 
This indicator was slightly lower for Abkhazia - 63%.
To the question what was the main trigger for the con-
flict in South Ossetia, the survey revealed that the major-
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ity, 49 % thought that America wanted to extend its influ-
ence to the countries bordering Russia, while 32% thought 
that the Georgian government was discriminating against 
the population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; only 5 % 
thought that Russia pursued a policy of “divide and con-
quer”, and another 5 % thought that the leaders of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia wanted to remain in power. 10% 
gave no answer (see Graph 3).  
Graph 3: In Your Opinion, What Was The Main Trigger for the Conflict 
in South Ossetia?
Source: Survey Conducted by the Russian public opinion research 
institute Levada-center, August 15-18, 2008.(Petrova, Russian Analytical 
Digest, 2008:17).
The number of the Russian people approving of Med-
vedev’s and Putin’s policies also significantly increased 
in August 2008 (Petrova, Russian Analytical Digest, 
2008:17-21). 
In connection to the above-said, the question arises 
whether Russian media could be held at least partly respon-
sible for influencing the Russian public opinion regarding 
Russia’s intervention in Georgia in 2008. 
The research questions derived from the research 
problem are the following:
●  How did the Russian media portray Georgia before 
and during the intervention (from March till August 2008)?
●  To what extent can the positive attitude of the Rus-
sian public towards Russia’s intervention in Georgia be at-
tributed to the Russian mainstream media coverage?    
●  Can the expressions of securitization and “manu-
facturing consent” be identified in the mainstream Russian 
media coverage of the issues related to Georgia? 
The theoretical framework underlying the research is 
Barry Buzan’s (et al., 1998) concept of securitization and 
Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky’s (1988) concept 
of manufacturing consent which was later elaborated by 
Anthony DiMaggio (2009). Securitization, according to 
Buzan, means presenting an issue – a country, a person, 
a group of people, a section of society, etc. -  as an exis-
tential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying 
actions beyond the normal rules (Buzan et al., 1998:24). 
Manufacturing consent concerns the role of media in 
establishing public opinion about the policies of the gov-
ernment. It is usually carried out by choice of topics, filter-
ing of information, giving priority to the coverage of the 
victims of the allies, reliance on one-sided sources, sup-
pressing critical dissent, mainly by creating the impression 
of lively debate by pre-assuming the official line of think-
ing from which the debate develops (DiMaggio, 2009). For 
our study it is particularly interesting, whether the securiti-
zation theory and manufacturing consent are applicable to 
some of the Russian media in terms of their coverage of the 
Russian government policies in relation to Georgia. 
Discourse analysis, the method of research which, 
according to James Paul Gee (2001) studies the nature of 
“language-in-use” is the most relevant method to study 
securitization, as Buzan (et al.,1998:177) also points out. 
The news items and articles from March till August were 
analyzed. It was decided to review some of the most popu-
lar media outlets in Russia, as revealed by a survey con-
ducted by a Russian website (Superjob portal, 2007), that 
coincided with the list of prominent Russian newspapers 
presented by a BBC article about the popular Russian press 
(BBC, 2008). Lenta and Ria Novosti are among the most 
popular online media outlets. They are followed by Gazeta, 
Argumenti I Fakti, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Rossiiskaya 
Gazeta, Moskovskii Komsomolets and Novaya Gazeta re-
spectively. These Russia newspapers and news agencies 
were reviewed, in particular, their coverage of the issues 
related to Georgia from March till August 2008. 
The findings of the research show that reliance on the 
sources representing one side was characteristic of the 
mainstream Russian media coverage before and during 
the Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008. They also re-
veal the trend of choice of words such as Russian “peace-
keepers” versus Georgian “troops/soldiers”, and allotting 
more space to anti-Georgian rhetoric. Status of the Russian 
peacekeepers is not questioned in the mainstream media. 
Saakashvili and the government of Georgia are both 
presented as extremely aggressive, undemocratic, unreli-
able, and discriminating against the residents of its separa-
tist regions, although regarding Saakashvili such portrayal 
is more explicit and toned up. The prospect of the acces-
sion of Georgia to NATO is presented as a major threat for 
the security of the Russian state.  This trend is reinforced 
by focusing on Georgian opposition to the government and 
presenting them as the victims of the dictator and the un-
democratic regime, which is intolerant of opposing views 
and attempts to silence them. Georgia is also described as 
a military state spending a big funding on weapons and 
army. The focus on the military side of Georgia naturally is 
accompanied by repeated allusions to terroristic acts affili-
ated with Georgia.
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Many articles present Russia as a supporter of peace 
and helping the people of the “unrecognized republics”. 
The trend of comparing the Georgian separatist regions to 
Kosovo and referring to the recognition of their independ-
ence is also evident. The  role of Russia in the separatist 
conflicts since the 1990-s is mentioned only in terms of 
the Russian “peacekeeping contingent”, whereas massive 
expulsion of Georgians from Abkhazia is ignored, neither 
are the self-proclaimed republics presented as historical re-
gions of Georgia. The statuses of the separatist regions in 
majority of cases are designated as republics or unrecog-
nized republics, and it is reiterated that they await recogni-
tion, rather than pointing out their internationally recog-
nized statuses as parts of Georgia. 
Another visible trend is presenting inflated numbers 
of casualties in South Ossetia, especially before and dur-
ing the first days of the intervention, followed by the state-
ments made by Russian officials and political scientists or 
journalists about the necessary measures to be undertaken 
in order to defend the Russian citizens and “peacekeepers” 
from “Georgian aggression”. The necessary measures are 
in most cases framed as using force to stop the bloodshed 
and punish Georgia for abusing of Russian citizens and 
“peacekeepers”, or even for genocide. The additional forc-
es and weapons sent by Russian government to Georgia are 
designated as reinforcement to aid the peacekeepers.
Some journalists seem to actively criticize Russia for 
its policies in relation to Georgia, hence giving an impres-
sion of a lively debate. Russia is also criticized for “the late 
response”, using outdated weaponry, high economic costs 
of the war and its negative consequences in terms of inter-
national image of Russia. President Medvedev is criticized 
for his indecisiveness to intervene, and so on. However, the 
right of Russia to intervene in a sovereign country is hardly 
questioned.
By contrast, some articles in different media and most-
ly in Novaya Gazeta dare to give a balanced and even criti-
cal view on Georgia-related issues and the 2008 August 
war. Certain amount of diversity of sources and perspec-
tives is noticeable in some articles, although to a limited 
extent except for Novaya Gazeta and partly Gazeta. No-
vaya Gazeta gives a drastically different perspective on the 
war and presents Georgia as a developing country with a 
reformer president, whereas Russia is presented as the ag-
gressor, determined to damage the reputation of Georgia in 
the eyes of international community, and creating an image 
of an enemy out of NATO and Georgia in order to increase 
the number of voters. Statuses of the separatist regions are 
designated as self-proclaimed or separatist, and separatist 
leaders as corrupt and deceptive provokers of war as well 
as the pawns used by Russia to achieve its aims.  Question-
ing the status of the peacekeepers is also noticeable in the 
alternative media. Their status is designated as “controver-
sial” and it is pointed out that bombarding different parts of 
Georgia cannot be considered a peacekeeping operation. It 
is said that the peacekeepers are not entitled to the weapon-
ry provided to them and the forces sent from Russia do not 
represent the reinforcement to the peacekeepers. The roles 
of USA, EU and NATO as models for Georgia in terms 
of the norms and principles of democracy are highlighted. 
Russia is criticized for its attitude towards Georgia, des-
ignated as “the complex of big brother”, by exposing its 
failure to treat Georgia as a sovereign country. 
The only newspaper out of the eight reviewed, Novaya 
Gazeta, which voices a totally different perspective and 
criticizes the government on the intervention and not on 
the superficial issues (as does the seemingly critical main-
stream media), is the least popular according to the surveys 
which determined the choice of the sources for the study. 
The different trends identified in the coverage of Geor-
gia-related issues by the mainstream and alternative Rus-
sian media, are summarized and compared in Table 1.
Based on the findings presented above, we can contend 
that the significant rise in the public approval of Putin and 
Medvedev’s policies after August 2008 may be partly at-
tributed to the trends identified in the mainstream Russian 
media. Portraying Georgia and its government as a threat, 
as well as the failure to challenge the right of Russia to in-
vade the sovereign neighbor supposedly lead to the public 
view of 78 %, who approved of the decision of the Rus-
sian leadership to send troops to South Ossetia to conduct 
a military operation. This trend, accompanied by ignoring 
the full picture regarding the history of the separatist con-
flicts, most likely caused the result according to which the 
majority of Russians in 2008 thought South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia were independent states rather than integral parts 
of Georgia.
The trend of presenting Georgia’s Western orientation 
and aspiration towards NATO as a big threat for Russia’s 
role in the region, may account for the survey result ac-
cording to which in August 2008 in the opinion of 66 % 
of Russians, the leaders of Western countries supported 
Georgia in order to weaken Russia and push it out of Cau-
casus, and the majority also thought the main trigger for 
the war was that USA wanted to extend its influence to 
the countries bordering Russia. Thus, it can be concluded 
that the Russian media may have had a significant impact 
on the positive attitude of the majority of Russians to-
wards their government’s policies in relation to Georgia 
in 2008. This argument is reinforced by the fact that the 
media outlets showing the mainstream trends, are some of 
the most popular among the Russian people, whereas the 
newspaper identified as the most critical towards the of-
ficial views (Novaya Gazeta), is the least popular out of 
those reviewed. It is interesting that the two most popular 
news agencies, Lenta and Ria Novosti are also the ones 
most actively disseminating the official perspective. 
In order to answer the third research question, the re-
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viewed trends identified in the mainstream Russian media 
have to be measured against the theoretical frames under-
lying the study, i.e. securitization and manufacturing con-
sent. 
In order to manufacture the consent of the Russian 
public, the Russian mainstream media seems to resort to 
selection of topics, framing of issues, emphasis and choice 
of particular words and phrases for each side, voicing 
concerns and disseminating information from particular 
sources, in order to silence or reduce the alternative per-
spectives. 
One of the most visible examples of choice of topics 
and filtering the information is expressed by covering the 
history of the separatist conflicts, when the media tries 
to disregard the information about the historical roles of 
the regions and their internationally recognized statuses 
as parts of Georgia, while instead highlighting the pros-
pects of recognition of their independence. Pointing to 
the independence of Kosovo as a legal precedent serves 
to prepare the public and manufactures their consent for 
the future recognition of the independence of the Geor-
gian separatist regions. The preparation of the public to 
accept the above-mentioned recognition seems even more 
important if we take into consideration Russia’s problems 
with separatism (Chechnya). Same can be said regarding 
the mainstream Russian media reliance of the particular 
sources of the information, mainly Russian officials, Os-
setian and Abkhazian separatist leaders and representatives 
of the de-facto governments of the separatists. Presenting 
interviews mainly with the Ossetian residents of the sepa-
ratist regions, while ignoring the concerns of the Georgian 
residents, as well as presenting inflated numbers of casual-
ties on the Ossetian side (worthy victims) designated as 
victims of ethnic cleansing, as opposed to the thousands of 
Georgian victims in Abkhazia in the 90s that are not men-
tioned despite the reiteration of the history of the conflicts 
of the 90s in the two separatist regions – meet the con-
cept of worthy-unworthy victims, as an obvious expres-
sion of manufacturing consent.Presenting the prospect of 
Georgia’s possible membership of NATO as a threat, can 
be viewed as the expression of anti-West and especially 
anti-American “religion” characteristic for the Russian re-
ality, and the expression of manufacturing consent by the 
Russian media. Allegory to Kosovo’s independence and 
Table 1: The contrasting messages delivered to the Russian people by the mainstream and alternative Russian media.
                  Mainstream Russian Media Messages                               Alternative Russian Media Messages
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regarding it as the reason to recognize the independence 
of Georgian separatist regions may also be viewed as the 
expression of manufacturing consent and attributed to the 
anti-Western “religion”, since Kosovo’s independence was 
recognized by a number of “Western” countries. 
Except for Novaya Gazeta and some articles in Gaze-
ta, the majority of the Russian mainstream media does not 
challenge the official line of thinking, but rather, “presup-
poses it, thus helping to establish it even more deeply as 
the very precondition of discussion, while also providing 
the appearance of a lively debate” (DiMaggio 2009:17). 
A good example of such a trend is also visible in the ar-
ticle where the journalist, despite considering “deferring 
the status” as a better option than “defining” it, thus giving 
the impression of having a view different from the offi-
cial one, contends that Russian “peacekeepers”, as the only 
source of maintaining peace in the region, should stay in 
Georgia. Furthermore, he thinks “pacifying the region” is 
the most beneficial option for Russia, and hence, it should 
be given a priority over the territorial integrity of Georgia. 
Even though the journalist gives the impression of chal-
lenging the official perspective, he implicitly assumes that 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the neighboring 
country, as well as the norms and principles of internation-
al law, are unimportant compared to what is beneficial to 
Russia. This type of “criticism” helps to reinforce the of-
ficial views among the public.
Choice of words, such as Russian “peacekeepers” ver-
sus Georgian “troops/soldiers”, together with the focus on 
the coverage of military side of Georgian state also serves 
to securitize Georgia by means of underlining its military 
nature and presenting it as a military or some other type 
of threat to Russia. Highlighting that the Georgian army 
is ten times bigger than that of South Ossetia, would sup-
posedly terrify laymen (especially those unaware of how 
small Georgia is compared to Russia by territory as well 
as by population),  and cause them to perceive Georgia as 
a significant military threat to Russia. Broad dissemina-
tion of the concerns regarding the all the above mentioned 
trends that express manufacturing consent, such as worthy 
and unworthy victims, allusion to Kosovo, presenting the 
separatist regions as victims of Georgia, ignoring the in-
formation about their historical place in the Georgian state 
and their internationally recognized statuses, or the role of 
Russia in fuelling the separatist conflicts, seem to logically 
lead to the securitizing speech acts about the necessity to 
undertake urgent forceful measures towards Georgia. 
The securitizing speech acts presented the issue of 
dealing with Georgia as existential, so important that in-
stead of exposing it to normal politics, that is, peaceful 
resolution of the conflict, it had to be dealt with decisive-
ly by top leaders - Putin, Medvedev and other high offi-
cials. The features of the speech acts included existential 
threat – mistreatment of Russian citizens and peacekeepers 
by Georgia, point of no return -  the necessity to “punish 
Georgia” and “stop the bloodshed”, and a possible way out 
- intervention of the Russian forces  in Georgia. The recog-
nition of the Georgian separatist regions by Russia can be 
regarded as the effect of the inter-unit relations, represent-
ing the last step of the process of securitization.
Thus, the answer to the third research question can be 
summarized and it can be concluded that the Russian main-
stream media have served as a tool of the government to 
securitize Georgia and manufacture consent of the Russian 
public for the Russian intervention in Georgia in August 
2008. 
After the review and analysis of the findings of the 
study, it can be concluded that by serving as a tool for the 
Russian government to securitize Georgia, the mainstream 
Russian media attempted to manufacture consent of the 
Russian people to gather public support for the policies 
of the Russian government in relation to Georgia in 2008. 
Manufacturing consent of the Russian public was carried 
out by relying on particular sources of information, selec-
tion of topics, filtering of information and choice of words 
and phrases, favoring “worthy” victims over “unworthy” 
ones, and presenting seemingly critical perspective while 
at the same time pre-assuming the official perspective. The 
study confirms the assumption introduced by Herman and 
Chomsky (1988) and elaborated by DiMaggio (2009), that 
it is possible for some media to cover certain policies seem-
ingly in a critical way, while at the same time presupposing 
the official view, leading the public to take it for granted 
without challenging it in terms of moral foundation or in-
ternational law. In this way, superficially but not genuinely 
critical media in fact reinforces the official perspective in 
the minds of the people. The trends expressing manufactur-
ing consent facilitated the portrayal of Georgia as a threat, 
and its securitization on the issues of international image 
and security, identity, military issues, and ideology of the 
state. It has also been concluded that the less popular alter-
native Russian media presented a drastically different im-
age of Georgia by providing a contrasting coverage of the 
issues related to Georgia.
The recommendations of the study concern the im-
portance of the role of the media especially in regard to 
guaranteeing the acceptance of certain government poli-
cies by the public. It suggests that more consideration be 
given to the media coverage of particular events, especially 
those regarding use of force and military intervention as 
urgent measures in order to avoid some designated threats. 
By giving deeper consideration to the seemingly criti-
cal discussions disseminated by the media, as well as the 
overall role of media in the process of securitization of a 
country, people or government, the public acceptance of 
unjust policies and even the implementation of such poli-
cies by the government may be avoided.  When the unjust 
policy concerns a military intervention, the role of media 
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becomes even more crucial. It can be suggested that the 
public should take into consideration the alternative cover-
age of the events and delivery of different perspectives, as 
well as attempt to identify and compare different trends 
of covering the same issues. By paying more attention to 
the media coverage of the government policies, and the ex-
pressions of securitization and manufacturing consent in 
the coverage, it may be possible to avoid the public sup-
port for military intervention rather than peaceful resolu-
tion of a conflict. This recommendation may be especially 
useful if the media coverage during a relatively long period 
preceding the military intervention is given consideration, 
when there is sufficient time to challenge the trends of se-
curitization and manufacturing consent identified in the 
mainstream media coverage
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